Iran-Contra Essays - Nicaraguan Revolution, IranContra Affair

Iran-Contra The Iran-Contra affair is not one scandalous incident, but rather two covert operations started under Reagan's administration. In the beginning, these two operations were independent of each other, but eventually became linked though funds received from the sale of arms to Iran for hostages and then given to the Contras fighting to overthrow a Marxist government in Nicaragua. The scandal began with Nicaraguan politics. After the Marxist Sandinista regime took over Nicaragua in 1979, the government was faced with a growing communist threat to US interest in Central America. When President Reagan took office in 1981, he was vehemently determined to halt the spread of communism, especially in Central America (Arnson 1989, 8). Seeking to bolster US prestige and military power, Reagan took a tough stand against communism in the Western Hemisphere. In Nicaragua, he gave the Central Intelligence Agency the approval to help organize and aid a group of Contrarevolucionarios or Contras who were in opposition to the Sandinista regime (Arnson 1989, 6). Congress, unwilling to fight in another country's war after the devastating loss in Vietnam, began restricting the use of government funds for rebel guerrillas in Central America. The CIA, concerned that soon Congress would cut off the funding for their program, began to stockpile arms for the contras (Walsh 1997, 18). Their fears were realized when Congress enacted the second Boland Amendment which stated: No funds available tot he Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose of which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual (Arnson 1989, 167-8). The Reagan administration interpreted the Boland Amendment as not covering the activities of the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was established in 1947 with the explicit purpose of advising the President on all matters relating to national security. Beginning with the Eisenhower administration, the NSC was given a small staff that ultimately grew and turned into a vital arm of the presidency. As years went by, the NSC staff began controlling the policy-making output of both State and Defense Department, as well as the activities of the CIA (Draper 1991, 11). When the CIA was banned from acting in Nicaragua by the second Boland amendment, President Reagan surreptitiously bypassed Congress and employed his NSC staff instead. National Security Council staffer Oliver North became the central coordinator supplying aid to the Contras. After Reagan's reelection in 1984, he began an additional covert operation. This time, it was the effort to release seven American hostages being held in Lebanon by a radical Islamic group called the Hezbollah. The operation included trading arms for hostages, which clearly violated the Arms Export Control Act, the National Security Act, and stated US policy not to deal with terrorists (Walsh 1997, 3). Iran, in the middle of a war with Iraq, was desperate for weapons. Many Iranians approached US officials offering t help free the hostages in Lebanon in exchange for arms. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane was approached by Israeli intermediaries and was persuaded to ask the President about negations with the Iranians. Reagan approved a shipment of 96 wire-guided anti-tank missiles to be delivered to Iran on August 30, 1985, and another 408 to be delivered on September 14. After the secret exchange of these weapons, the Iranians released only one hostage. In an effort to release more hostages, a second large shipment of weapons was to take place in November. The Israeli aircraft intended to ship the weapons could not fly directly to Iran. The plan was to fly to a European air base, transfer the cargo to another plane and then fly to Iran, but they were not able to obtain the necessary clearance to do so. From that point on, Oliver North began arranging for CIA planes to carry the shipment of weapons to Iran (Walsh 1997, 5). The President then decided to drop the Israelis as middlemen and negotiated the direct sale of arms from the United Stated to Iran. HE also decided to keep these actions secret from Congress. North subsequently began selling the Iranians missiles at marked up prices. He negotiated low purchase price with the Department of Defense and the surplus funds were then used to pay for aid to the Contras (Walsh 1997, 20). Two unrelated incidents that revealed Iranian and Contra covert operations occurred within one month of each other. On October 5, 1986, Sandinista troops shot down an

One Word Changed Over Time NIgger essays

One Word Changed Over Time NIgger essays My niggas. Some niggas that you dont wanna try. My niggas. Some niggas thats really do or die. My niggas. Aint no longer living a lie. My niggas is stong. My niggas is real. Does this artist use the word nigger in the same way that racists have and still are? The answer to this question is a simple one- no. Todays urban society have changed, not only the definition, but also the spelling of this word, which was once used to belittle those of African-American decent. Now, the definition as proved through todays urban youth holds many denotations- positive and negative. But has the definition really changed? Or are todays urban society just being ignorant and socially blinded by the hardships of our ancestors as they continue to use a word that held such great racial tension when used in the 1800s? Two answers for this one- yes and no. Yes the definition has changed, but not totally to where its precedent has been forgotten. In fact, urban youth are so socially powerful that they can take a word and totally flip it and use it within themselves but when one of another race uses it, they return it back to the old definition and the racial remarks comme nce. The definitions of the word nigger are as follows: 2. loosely or incorrectly applied to members of dark-skinned race 3. a vulgar offensive term of hostility and contempt as used by Negrophobes 1. Latin niger becomes Spanish and Portugese Negro used in France for black man especially in Africa adapted by the English 2. latin niger, for black, occurs in such river names as the Rio Negro in South America and the Niger f Central West Africa. When used by a white person to describe a black or African American person, this can be the most hateful hurtful, offensive term in the language today. This word in American speech dates back to the late 16th century, although the modern spelling doesn...

ART Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words - 9

ART - Essay Example In this case, one can definitely say that the painting is not at all beautiful. On the other hand, if the painter uses same color shades all over the body parts, that painting can be considered as a beautiful one. In short, color combination plays an important role in deciding whether an artwork is good or bad. Different societies perceive beauty differently. For example, earrings, bracelets, chains, bangles etc are considered as beauty enhancing materials in some societies whereas in other societies, such things are not at all considered so. For example, David Beckham wears an earring in one ear. For many British and European people, that earring is definitely enhancing the beauty of David Beckham. â€Å"According to the BBC, "more lads than ever are buying jewellery - not for their girlfriends, but for themselves. Experts think it is because they are being influenced by famous kings of Bling, like David Beckham and rappers† (To pierce? Why pierce? He pierced). It is not necessary that an Indian or Chinese may consider the earring of Beckham as a beauty enhancing ornament. Many people do believe that earring enhance the beauty of females rather than that of the males. In short, beauty is highly individualistic and subjective and the perceptions of it vary from societies to

The Effects of Teacher Morale on Student Learning and Performance Research Paper

The Effects of Teacher Morale on Student Learning and Performance - Research Paper Example There are many reasons that can direct effects on morale of the teacher. For example, if the school management does not involve teachers in their decision making process, increased duties, limited assistance and the low salaries paid to highly educated teachers (Houchard, 2005). Moreover, the public criticism and ignorance by the students due to the parents support may also affect the morale of a teacher directly. Due to that, many of the teachers left this profession and even I am seriously considering leaving this profession due to the low morale. On the other hand, I have to complete the session with my students at school. While, I could easily provide meaningful learning to my students, but the low morale is affecting willingness, because of the school administration. In the studies by one source, morale is defined as it is the feeling of a worker that is based on the job and feeling about the job (Rowland, 2008). That feeling can be a mental attitude and emotional attitude. Likewise, teachers’ morale is also based on their feeling about their jobs and duties, which are most important to build the future of a student (Whitaker, Whitaker, & Lumpa, 2013). Since, I am a victim of low morale in the teaching career therefore, this action report aimed to seek out the empirical evidence on the relationship between teacher’s morale and its effects on the student’s performance, learning and achievements. During the past 15 years and so, the teacher’s education research helped in significant strides while studying the relationship between teacher’s morale, practices, beliefs impacts and student’s achievements. The significance of the teacher’s morale can be established through the performance and learning of the students; the benefits can easily figure out by the achievement levels of students. In the literature, there are many research studies conducted by many scholars of educational

Our task is to research Google and discover at least 5 technologies Essay

Our task is to research Google and discover at least 5 technologies they have developed (or are currently developing), other tha - Essay Example This paper analyses five latest technologies or business developed or developing by Google other than search engine and advertising. Google's Self-Driving Cars â€Å"Google's self-driving cars have absolutely nothing to do with Google's core business, and Google has never even tried to explain how they're going to make money. They push technology forward. They could make people's lives better in real, tangible ways† (Rosoff, 2012). Even though the concept of self-driven cars is proposed by many people in the past, nobody has shown the courage to develop technologies needed for such cars. It should be noted that no prominent automobile companies came forward with a self-driven car yet even though they are spending billions of dollars for the development of environmental friendly vehicles. Google on the other hand thought differently and introduced world’s first self-driven car recently. There are plenty of physically handicapped people in this world who are unable to dri ve their vehicles. Self-driven vehicles would definitely help such people immensely. It is difficult for such people to rely the services of drivers all the time. For example, if the driver is not staying with them, it is difficult for them to go to hospital or any other places in nights or in emergency situations. Google’s self-driven cars may provide a perfect answer to the problems of physically handicapped people. ... The second advantage of the self-driven cars is the reduced incidents of accidents. Since self-driven cars are operated or driven by the machines, man made errors may not cause any accidents while traveling in such vehicles. It should be noted that a substantial portion of the vehicle accidents are taking place because of careless driving. Self-driven vehicles do not need the supervision of the human and hence the possibility of mistakes is very less. There are certain disadvantages also while using self-driven vehicles. Since self-driven vehicles are fully operated by the machines, the chances of mechanic problems and fatal errors in decision making cannot be ruled out. For example, if the front and back sensors of the self-driven vehicles are not functioning properly, the possibility of accidents may increase. It is not necessary that the computers used in the self-driven vehicles may have the intelligence to take error free decisions all the time. Human intelligence is superior to artificial intelligence. In other words, the creator will always superior to his creations. Under such circumstances, there is no guarantee for accident free driving while using machine controlled vehicles. There is nothing ethically wrong in using self-driven vehicles. However, it should not be forgotten that machines are gradually increasing its influence upon human life. Increased dependence machine for the sustainment of human life may not bring the good in the long run. At the time of driving human is developing some skills. Decision making skills and problems solving skills are also developed by drivers while driving. Self-driven vehicles may deprive such skill development opportunities to the

European Telecommunications Policy on Liberalisation

European Telecommunications Policy on Liberalisation Introduction This paper critically discusses the European telecommunications policy which is mainly intended to liberalise all telecommunications goods and services. Telecommunications policy is concerned with fixed telephone network, telephone (voice) service, other services based on the telephone network, mobile telephony and electronic information network services such as the internet. Communications technologies services serve as a vital link between industry, the services sector and market as well as between peripheral areas and economic centres.[1] There is therefore no question as to the importance of having a telecommunications policy in place to ensure industrial competitiveness and economic and social cohesion. What cannot, however, escape comment is the kind of telecommunications policy introduced in Europe by the European Union. Background information European telecommunications policy started with a Council Decision and Resolution on standardisation of in the field of information technology which was adopted in 1987.[2] The aim of the Decision and Resolution was to create a European market in telecommunications equipment. This was meant to ensure that competition prevails across member states and also to ensure exchange of information, the convergence of industrial strategies and the creation of exploitation of a vast European information technologies and telecommunications market. A Directive was issued in 1999 to establish a single market for radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment. The Directive also prescribes the mutual recognition of their conformity based on the principle of the manufacturer’s declaration.[3] In order to succeed in creating a single market in telecommunications services it was realised that telecommunications markets had to be liberated so that user would be able to procure and connect terminal equipment without the obligation of applying to a single national telecommunications authority. To this end, member states are therefore required to bring an end excusive and special rights remaining in the telecommunications, the restrictions on the installations used for mobile networks as well as the interconnection between such networks. Suppliers of telecommunications services are also entitled to use capacity on cable television networks for all communications services, main data communications, closed corporate networks and multimedia services. Complete liberalisation of voice telephony and telecommunications infrastructure was are intended to be achieved. National regulatory authorities are also required to contribute to the development of the internal market by way of co-o peration with each other and with the Commission to ensure the consistent application in all member states. In 2002, a Directive[4] was issued for the establishment of a harmonised regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services throughout the European Union. The Directive takes account of all electronic communications networks and services within it scope. The electronic communications networks and services include transmissions system and routing equipment as well as other resources which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic means. They also include satellites networks, fixed and mobile-terrestrial networks, electricity cable system networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks. There is also what is known as the â€Å"telecoms package† under which four specific directives were issued. One of these Directives concerns access. It is intended to provide a framework for rules that are applicable to specific products or service markets in particular geographical area. It is also intended to address identified market problems between access and interconnection suppliers.[5] For example, it gives operators of public communications a right and also impose obligation on them to negotiate interconnection with each other for the purpose of providing publicly available electronic communications services, so as to ensure provision and interoperability of services throughout the European community. One of the specific Directives also concerns authorisation. It is intended to implement an internal market in electronic communications networks and services through the harmonisation and simplification of authorisation rules and conditions in order to facilitate their provision throughout the community. [6] The Directive requires member states to ensure the freedom to provide electronic networks and services, subject to certain conditions set out in the Directive. Member states are therefore obliged not to prevent an undertaking from providing electronic communications networks or services without proper reasons.[7] The Directive also stipulates that the general authorisation system should apply to all such services and networks irrespective of their technological characteristics and should limit administrative barriers to entry into the market to a minimum. Another of the specific Directives concerns universal service and users. It is intended to ensure universal service provision for public telephony services in an environment of greater overall competitiveness, with provisions for financing the cost of providing a universal service in the most competitively neutral manner and for ensuring a maximum of information transparency.[8] Also, the Directive is intended to ensue the interoperability of digital consumer television equipment and the provision of certain mandatory services. Furthermore, the Directive establishes the rights of users and consumers of electronic communications service. The fourth specific Directive concerns the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communication sector.[9] It harmonises the provision of member states required to ensure an equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms and in particular the right to privacy. It also ensures the free movement of such data and of electronic communication equipment and services in the community. There is an axis of the European telecommunications policy called the â€Å"technological development in telecommunications, which is pursued by research in advanced communication technologies and services. European research technological development policy is directed towards strengthening the scientific and technological basis of community industry and encouraging it to become more competitive at international level, while promoting all the research activities considered necessary by virtue of other chapters of the Treaty.[10] Other axis is known as â€Å"trans-European telecommunications network†. The networks are national digital networks which aim to introduce innovative trans-European services in the general interest. They also aim to contribute to the development of the information society in terms of growth, employment, social cohesion and participation for all in he knowledge-based economy.[11] Assessment of the policy The European telecommunications policy is said to have contributed greatly to the development of the telecommunication industry.[12] A member of the European Union Commission responsible for information society and media also claims that: â€Å"†¦ good implementation of the EU framework is paying off. EU countries that have applied the EU rules in a timely and efficient manner, following the principle of competition, have clearly achieved the best results in terms of investment in new networks and take-up of new innovative services It is rare for issues to arise where social justice and economic reality go hand in hand. I believe this is the case for the Information Society. All countries will have to liberalise their telecom networks in the end. This is unavoidable. Those that fight against it often do so in the name of social justice. They argue that liberalisation will reduce economic and social cohesion. The rich will get richer and the poor will be poorer. However, there is no inherent conflict between liberalisation and social justice in the field of the Information Society.†[13] According to the Commissioner, Variations of regulatory approach are today an obstacle to the internal market and to effective competition: If a national regulator in country A applies the EU rules vigorously to the operators on its market, while the national regulator in country B adopts a more lenient policy towards the dominant operator by adopting remedies later or in a less efficient way, this gives companies in country B an unfair competitive advantage over companies in country A. In Europe’s internal market, this is unacceptable. The Commissioner expressed belief that the Commission should be able to ensure consistency in remedies proposed by national regulators to enhance competition in market dominated by one or more operators. This, the Commissioner said was a logical adjunct to the Commission’s current role as regards market definitions and market power assessments. The Commission has three functions within the telecommunications area: the promotion of European telecommunications policy; regulation of competition and as a watchdog on the application of the Treaty of Rome. The commissioner’s remarks show that the aim of the policy has not been fully achieved. It is correct to say that, the European telecommunication policy has its shortcomings. First of all, one wonders how a policy which has separate national regulators for each member country can be said to be effective. There is no doubt that if the EU wants to achieve a real level playing field where telecommunication operators can compete satisfactorily with one another then there must be an independent telecommunications authority whose duty would be to ensure efficient implementation of the rules across member states. Such an authority would have the authority to require national regulators to co-operate with it. It is argued that the creation of a centralised authority was successf ully prevented by member states even though centralisation was regarded as a necessary step in the process of liberalisation and promotion of an integrated enfrastructure.[14] One criticism directed at the policy is that the regulatory regime has evolved which is framed and instructed by European guidelines but varies from member state to member state in several respects without a short-term or medium-term perspective to converge on a single regulatory model.[15] Alabau (2006) also argues that one does not have to analyse it very hard to realise that what the Commission wanted to do was simply to impose a single European licence, making services subject to the same policy that it applied to the free movement of goods. That was why the Framework Directive referred to Article 8 of the Treaty. In his view, the Member States were not going to give way on the mutual recognition of licences. Granting licences for operating telecommunications services in their territory represented an area of sovereignty that they simply were not prepared to give up. This situation, which might have made sense in the case of value added services, verged on the unreasonable when the decision to liberalise voice telephony services and infrastructures was made.[16] It was revealed during the EU telecom conference in Geneva in 1999 a number of issues could be identified. The first was the degree of independence enjoyed by national regulators. At a minimum, regulated authorities must be independent of the telecommunications operator(s) if any liberalisation of services is to be successful. Competitors should not enter a market unless the dominant operator is subject to independent regulation to ensure that monopoly services are provided to competitors at a price that allows them to compete effectively. Second, it was observed that notwithstanding the progress that has been made in many market segments, incumbents still largely dominate national markets. The biggest problem in this respect is their overwhelming dominance in local access networks. Some member states are believed to have already responded to this by forcing the incumbent to unbundle the local loop. Third, wide variations in the degree of competition between Member States are inevita ble, given their different starting points. However, this is also the result of differences in the regulatory framework, which in some areas is not consistently applied. It is for European Commission to set an overall telecommunications policy framework in the distribution of licenses. The duty of the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) was to implement such objectives through specific legislative measures. All member states awarded more than one license in accordance with EU competition rules. However, while some states preferred to award licence through auction, others opted for what is known as the â€Å"beauty contest†. There are a number of flaws associated with either of these options. In any member state where auctioning was preferred, it emerged that the auctioning was problematic. The licence fee is said to be extremely high. â€Å"The danger of an open-ended auction is that the companies, in trying to outdo each other, will drive up the costs ridiculously.†[i] The ‘ridiculous costs’ of licenses may generate a chain of events with profound implications on 3G services and on overall economic welfare. One argument against auctioning states that due to the high cost of spectrum, telcos are forced to pass these costs on to consumers via higher prices, which in turn, retards the development of mobile data services due to lower mobile uptake by consumers). Ultimately, the deceleration in development will have wide-ranging implications for national economies as a whole†.[17] Auctions is also said to favour well-capitalised incumbent telcos which can afford to pay high premiums for spectrum, while smaller, possibly more innovative telcos who may be able to develop products faster while providing it at a better service, are left out due to capital constraints. Consequently, fewer competitors will exist in the market, keeping prices higher and products and services less innovative.[18] With regard to licence fee, the British Government has been criticised. It observed that higher prices to the consumer and the threat of investment stifling in 3G networks were both risks that might delay the rollout of 3G services and ultimately, adversely affect a country’s economic development. Many governments, including Ireland, have chosen not to use an auction to avoid the aforementioned risks. According to Professor Peter Cramton from the University of Maryland, beauty contests suffer from several problems. First, they are extremely slow and wasteful.[19] Second, beauty contests lack transparency. It is difficult to see why one proposal won out over another. Worse yet, the ability of the regulator to successfully identify the best proposals is limited.[ii] The Radio communications Agency, which manages the UK’s radio spectrum, admits it considered various options for 28GHz, including a beauty contest. But in a report on the two processes, it concluded that with a beauty contest it would be difficult to keep the selection procedure 1) objective, 2) non-discriminatory and 3) transparent, as required by the EC Licensing Directive.[20] It argued that the danger of utilizing beauty contests as a basis for assigning licenses for 3G mobile networks is that the criteria may be influenced by subjectively biased national factors that may prejudice open decision making.[21] Conclusion It will be unfair to say that the European telecommunications policy has not achieved any success. One may to a large extent agree with the assertion that the policy has contributed greatly the development of the telecommunication industry. However, as seen above, the policy is far from perfect. The entire blame cannot be shifted to the European Commission. The unwillingness on the part of member states to have an independent European telecommunications authority has contributed to the problem. Having identified this as a problem herself, the EU Commissioner responsible for information society and media stated at the 2006 European Competitive Telecommunications Association conference that the most effective and less bureaucratic way to achieve a real level plying ground field for telecom operators was to replace the present system by an independent authority that will act like European Central Bank. One cannot but only that in future member states will realise the need to have such a system in place. References Chapman, Matt. â€Å"Auction of Radio Spectrum Comes Back to Haunt Telcos,† Network News,  Sep 6, 2000 Eliassen, Kjell, A. and Sjovaag, Marit. European Communication Liberalisation. London:  Routledge. 1999 Lehr, W. and T. Kiessling. (1999). Telecommunication Regulation in the United States,  Europe: The Case for Centralized Authority. In S. Eisner Gillett and I. Vogelsang,  eds, Competition, Regulation, and Convergence. Current Trends in Telecommunications Policy Research. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 105-20. Reding, Viviane, Review of the EU Telecom Rules: Strengthening Competition and Completing  the Internal Market†. 27 June 200http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/422> Schneider, Volker and Werle, Raymund, Telecommunications Policy. In Graziano,  Paolo, and Vink, Maarten, eds Europeanization: New Research Agendas. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2006). Chapter 20  Nourafchan, Raphael. The Political Economy of European Telecommunications Policy: auctions  versus Beauty Contests Footnotes [1] Moussis, Nicholas, Access to European Union: Law, Economic Policies. Rixensart, Belgium: European.  Union Services [2] Repealed, see Council Decision (1999/468 EC) [3] Directive 1999/5/EC [4] Directive 2002/21/ EC [5] Directive 2002/19/EC [6] Directive 2002?20/ EC [7] The reasons are set out in Article 46(1) of the Treaty [8] Directive 2002/22/EC [9] Directive 2002/58/EC [10] Decision 182/1999/EC [11] Decision 336/97/EC [12] Liikanen, Erkki, Telecom 1999 Conference, Geneva, 1999. 07 August 2007. http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_1999_2004/liikanen/media/speeches/19991010.htm> [13] Reding, Viviane, Review of the EU Telecom Rules: Strengthening Competition and Completing the  Internal Market†. 27 June 2006. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/422> [14]  Lehr, W. and T. Kiessling. (1999). Telecommunication Regulation in the United States,  Europe: The Case for Centralized Authority. In S. Eisner Gillett and I. Vogelsang, eds,  Competition, Regulation, and Convergence. Current Trends in Telecommunications  Policy Research. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 105-20. [15]  Schneider, Volker and Werle, Raymund, Telecommunications Policy. In Graziano,  Paolo, and Vink, Maarten, eds Europeanization: New Research Agendas.  Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2006). Chapter 20 [16] Alabau, Antonio, â€Å"European Union and its Electronic Communications Policy; Thirty Years In Perspective† [17]Nourafchan, Raphael. The Political Economy of European Telecommunications Policy: auctions versus Beauty  Contests [18] Ibid. [19] Even with streamlined hearings, it took the FCC an average of two years to award thirty cellular licenses. Competitors  Spend vast sums trying to influence the regulator’s decision (Peter Cramton 2001). [20]  Chapman, Matt. â€Å"Auction of Radio Spectrum Comes Back to Haunt Telcos,† Network News, Sep 6, 2000 [21] Telecoms Standards Approvals Review, â€Å"3G Licensing: France to Use Selection Process,† Jun 20, 2000 [i] [ii]

Bulimia and Depression Essay -- Causes of Bulimia, Eating Disorders

Bulimia and Depression The prevalence of eating disorders among American women has increased dramatically in the past decade. In turn, the psychological community has expanded it's scope of research and study by focusing more attention on eating disorders and concentrating on other extended issues related to eating disorders. The desire to distinguish and understand a possible relationship between bulimia nervosa and depression has become a major focus within the field. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the reader to literature from two different journal articles on this relationship. How Are Bulimia and Depression Possibly Related?: Presently, there are two predominant hypotheses on the relationship between bulimia nervosa and depression. The first hypothesis states that bulimia nervosa is an affective variant of depression. (Hinz and Williamson, 1987) This idea came about due to early reports of a high prevalence of clinical depression in bulimics and a high lifetime prevalence of depression in the families of these patients. Recent studies, however, provide evidence that this type of relationship between bulimia and depression is still unconfirmed. (Levy et al., 1989) The second hypothesis constitutes that bulimia is a "distinctive diagnostic entity with a psychopathological process different from that of other mental disorders". (Hinz, et al., 1987) The following articles review the findings of research which effect the level of support for these two hypotheses. Cognitive Comparisons in Defining Bulimia and Depression: Bulimia is characterized by a number of symptoms. Many of these symptoms are also common among depression. Schlesier-Carter, et al., 1989 state that for bulimia, "the distinctiv... ... psychopathological process different from that of other mental disorders". (Hinz, et al., 1987) Further research and study on the relationship between bulimia and depression is highly encouraged. With the high percentage of depression found in bulimic patients, understanding the link between these disorders is essential for treatment development. Bibliography: Hinz, L. and Williamson, D. (1987). "Bulimia and Depression: A Review of the Affective Variant Hypothesis". Psychological Bulletin, 102(1), 150-158. Levy, A., Dixon, K., and Stern, S. (1989). "How are Depression and Bulimia Related". The American Journal of Psychiatry, 146(2), 162-168. Schlesier-Carter, B., Hamilton, S., O'Neil, P., Lydiard, R., and Malcolm, R. "Depression and Bulimia: The Link Between Depression and Bulimic Cognitions". Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 98(3), 322-325.